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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TIMOTHY KENT REDMOND, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No- 950338-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of stolen 
property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 76-6-408 (1995), in the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and 
for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable John R. Anderson, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Should this Court review defendant's claim that he was 
denied an impartial jury when defendant affirmatively approved of 
the trial court's remedy of a potential jury problem? "[I]f a 
party through counsel . . . has led the trial court into error, 
[an appellate court] will then decline to save that party from 
the error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989), 
cert, denied. Bullock v. Utah. 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct. 3270 
(1990). 
2. Should this Court consider the merits of defendant's 
claim that evidence was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict of guilt when he has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict? Failure to marshal the evidence 
in support of the jury's verdict of guilt waives an appellantfs 
right to have his claim of insufficiency considered on appeal. 
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.), cert, denied. 
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP R^gg 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules 
are pertinent to this issues on appeal: 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995) 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, 
retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, 
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in 
concealing, selling, or withholding the 
property from the owner, knowing the property 
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner 
of it. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Timothy Kent Edmond, was charged with possession 
of stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995) (R. 1). Following a jury trial 
defendant was convicted of the offense as charged (R. 59). The 
trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one-to-fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison (R. 129-30). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THg FACT?1 
Ffrgtg Rating tP Jury Imp^ytj^IAty CX»im 
Shortly after prospective jury members began arriving at the 
district court, defense counsel discovered that the court's daily 
calender had been posted on the bulletin board in the office in 
which the panel members checked in (R. 204, 218-19). The 
calender indicated that, in addition to defendant's trial in this 
case, defendant would also have a disposition hearing on a theft 
of services charge (Daily calender, R. 58, attached at Addendum 
A). Defense counsel removed the notice, not knowing whether any 
venireman had seen the disposition notice (R. 205-06) . 
The trial court initially thought that five or six venireman 
might have looked at the notice, and the prosecutor suggested 
calling a new jury or asking the venireman directly if any of 
them had seen the notice (R. 205-07). The trial court rejected 
the prosecutor's remedies when the court clerk indicated that the 
prospective jurors had signed in and received their checks in the 
order in which they arrived and there had not been more six or 
seven jurors in the office when defense counsel removed the 
notice (R. 206-07). In response to the trial court's suggestion 
that the venireman who came in while the notice was posted be 
excused, defense counsel stated, WI think that's the best thing 
we can do" (R. 206). Thereafter, responding to concerns about 
the adequacy of the venire's size if the first-appearing 
venireman were excused, defense counsel twice indicated his wish 
1
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Cosey. 873 P.2d 1177, 1178 (Utah App.), 
Cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). Accord State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1992). 
3 
to proceed, stating, "I want to give it a shot" and uwe have done 
the best thing we can" (R. 209, 210). 
The trial court then made a record of its remedy of the 
problem, indicating that the procedure stipulated to by the 
parties would cure any possible prejudice to defendant (R. 218). 
Defense counsel specifically agreed that he would not object to 
the method by which the problem had been cured (R. 217). Shortly 
afterward, however, it became apparent that, because there 
existed the possibility that prospective jury members might not 
have signed in in the precise order in which they arrived and 
possibly glanced at the bulletin board, there was no absolute 
certainty that the venireman to be excused were the only ones who 
had seen the notice (R. 218-19). Nonetheless, after consulting 
with the clerk responsible for signing in and paying the 
prospective jurors and who had watched the jurors enter the 
office, defense counsel expressed his willingness to have the 
trial court cure any problem by excusing the first five venireman 
only (R. 220). When the prosecutor requested assurance that 
defense counsel would not later move for a mistrial, defense 
counsel responded, "Well, I think we have agreed to this 
disposition we have done it [sic]" (R. 220). Thereafter, the 
first five venireman were specifically identified and later 
excused (R. 221, 227). 
Facts A4<fo<?e4 at Tri»I delating tP Offense 
On September 23, 1994, Lee Berge, owner of LA Auto in Orem, 
noticed that a red 1985 Mazda GLC, listed for sale at $2950, was 
4 
missing from the lot (R. 297-99, 302) .2 The car had passed a 
safety inspection prior to its disappearance (R. 309). However, 
when he ultimately recovered the car it was in very different 
condition, to wit: the emblems, windshield wipers, steering 
wheel cover, visors, spare tire, jack and tools, radio and area 
around the shifter had been removed (R. 305-06) . 
Several days prior to the theft of the red Mazda, on 
September 18, sixteen year-old Andrea Hardman met defendant, who 
was then dating Andrea's sister, Angela Davis, in Vernal at her 
mother's house (R. 341-43, 347). On that date defendant was 
driving a blue 1983 Mazda, which, in the presence of Andrea's 
mother, Diane Davis, and sister, he offered to sell to Andrea for 
$500 (R. 343-44) . On September 20 or 21 Andrea test drove the 
blue Mazda and made plans to buy it (R. 344, 348). Andrea next 
saw defendant on September 24 at her house, at which time 
defendant was driving a red Mazda with Washington state license 
plates. Defendant claimed to have gotten the car from "some guy 
in Orem" (R. 348-49, 372). Diane Davis also saw defendant 
driving a little red Mazda on September 28, which he claimed to 
have gotten from some guy in Orem for $200, when defendant 
stopped at her house en route to Dinosaur with her daughter 
Angela (R. 372). 
On September 25 or 26 Andrea saw defendant again, this time 
at his apartment (R. 350) . Both the red Mazda that she had 
earlier seen defendant with and the blue Mazda were in the 
2
 Berge testified that he purchased the car for about 
$1600.00, plus freight and mechanics expenses (R. 302-03). He 
also put in another engine at a cost of $300.00 to $350.00 and a 
rebuilt transmission at a cost of 423.50 (R. 303-04). 
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driveway with their hoods raised (R. 350, 352). Andrea asked 
defendant if the red car was for sale, and defendant offered to 
sell it to her for $100 (R. 351). Andrea noticed that the Mazda 
stickers had been torn off (R. 352). Defendant said that he had 
taken parts from the red Mazda and put them in the blue Mazda so 
that it would be in really good running shape for her (R. 352). 
On October 7, Andrea and her husband, Doug Hardman, drove to 
defendant's apartment where they saw defendant packing all his 
belongings into a silver Mazda (R. 52-53). In the driveway the 
Hardmans saw the red Mazda (R. 353). Andrea and Doug 
collectively testified that the radio, back seat, the dashboard 
and part of the console and the steering wheel cover were missing 
from the red Mazda (R. 354, 451-54). After seeing the condition 
of the red Mazda, Andrea renewed her offer to buy the blue Mazda 
(R. 354). Defendant responded that he would just give her the 
red Mazda for parts (R. 354). The Hardmans drove to their home 
to get a tow rope, but on the way Doug told Andrea that he did 
not want the car (R. 355, 455). 
Andrea returned to defendant's apartment intending to tell 
him that she no longer wanted the red Mazda, but was persuaded by 
defendant, who was in a hurry to leave, that the car would be 
good for parts and that he had to get it out of his driveway (R. 
355-56, 373, 376). With Andrea in the red Mazda, defendant used 
the silver Mazda to push the red car to Andrea's house (R. 356, 
455-56). Coincidentally, Diane Davis saw defendant pushing her 
daughter in the red Mazda while driving her own car (R. 357, 
386). Before leaving, defendant removed the license plates and 
directed her, after she was done using the car for parts, to push 
it to a nearby apartment complex where there were twenty to 
6 
thirty old cars sitting (R. 357-58). He also told her that 
because it was a "parts" car, she should never attempt to license 
it (R. 356-57). Diane Davis similarly testified that defendant 
told her that when Andrea was done removing parts and tires for 
the blue Mazda Andrea should haul the car to the junk yard (R. 
385). When Diane asked defendant about a bill of sale or title, 
defendant told her that he had a bill of sale but that it had 
gotten mixed up with his things during his move. He also 
cautioned her not to make any attempt to license the car (R. 
3 85). Andrea did not see defendant again after October 7 (R. 
342) . 
Suspicious of defendant's directions to his wife, Doug 
notified the police about the car the following day, October 8 
(R. 456). Vernal Patrolman Drew Christiansen investigated the 
matter and found that the vehicle identification number (VIN) of 
the red Mazda left at the Hardman residence matched that of the 
red 1985 Mazda GLC stolen from LA Auto in Orem on September 24 
(R. 326-27, 330). 
At trial, defendant claimed that the prosecution witnesses 
concocted their testimony to hide their own connection with the 
stolen vehicle, with which he had no association. Defendant 
testified that he never possessed the stolen red 1985 Mazda (R. 
416). He claimed instead that he had purchased a red 1982 Mazda 
from an Antonio Vigil for $100, for which he had a bill of sale, 
and which he later sold to Rachel Bezzant (R. 407-09). Rachel 
Bezzant testified that defendant had sold her a red 1982 GLC 
Mazda hatchback in November of 1994 (R. 398-99). According to 
defendant, it was the 1982 Mazda that was in Vernal on October 7 
(R. 413). On that date he and his wife, Chris Redmond, drove to 
7 
Vernal in his blue Mazda and returned to Orem that evening with 
Chris driving the red 1982 Mazda after seeing Floyd Collett, LDS 
bishop of the ninth ward in Vernal (R. 414-15). In support, 
Collett testified that he met with defendant at 7:00 p.m., just 
before defendant left Vernal for Orem (R. 3 93-96).3 Chris 
Redmond testified in accordance with defendant concerning her 
movements on October 7 (R. 440-44). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim that 
he was denied an impartial jury because he affirmatively endorsed 
the trial court's solution to the possibility that some 
prospective jurors had seen the daily calender indicating that 
defendant had a misdemeanor matter pending before the court. 
Defense counsel strongly agreed with the trial court's suggestion 
that only those prospective jurors likely to have seen the notice 
be excused and, further, announced that he would not move for a 
mistrial based on the court's handling of the problem. Thus, any 
error in the manner of curing the problem was invited by 
defendant. Moreover, any error was harmless since defendant 
testified on direct examination that he had previously been 
convicted of felony forgery. 
3
 Collett's testimony was intended to discredit any 
association of defendant with the red Mazda by showing 
inconsistency in the times the witnesses said defendant pushed 
the car to the Hardman residence, to wit: Andrea Hardman 
testified the event occurred at about 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. (R. 369, 
373), Diane Davis said it occurred before 8:00 p.m., when the sun 
was setting and it was not yet dark (R. 3 88) , and Doug Hardman 
that it would have been about 4:00 to 4:30 p.m. (R. 459). 
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POINT H 
Defendant has failed to marshal evidence in support of the 
jury's verdict, and therefore, this Court should refuse to 
consider his claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict 
him of possession of stolen property. In any case, the evidence 
was sufficient. Defendant was found in possession of a vehicle 
which indisputably had been stolen, weeks after the theft and 
which he had torn apart. His knowledge that the car was stolen 
was further demonstrated by his deliberately cautioning witnesses 
not to license the car and to dispose of it among other junk cars 
after they had used it for parts. 
hRGJjmm 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS 
RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY IS WITHOUT 
SUBSTANTIVE MERIT AND CONSTITUTES INVITED 
ERROR 
"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection must be 
made in order to preserve an issue for appeal. Absent a timely 
objection, [an appellate court] will review an alleged error only 
if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes 'plain 
error.'" State v. Whittle. 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989) 
(citations omitted). "But if a party through counsel has made a 
conscious decision to refrain from objection or has led the trial, 
court into error, fan appellate court! will then decline to save 
that party from the error." State vT gullQCk, 791 P.2d 155, 158 
(Utah 1989) (emphasis added), cert, denied, Bullock v. Utah. 497 
U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990). See State v. Smith. 776 P.2d 
929, 932 (Utah App. 1989) ("A defendant cannot lead the court 
into error by failing to object and then later, when he is 
9 
displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions."); State v. 
Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 177-78 (Utah App. 199) (refusing to 
review on appeal either the defense counsel's performance or the 
trial court's discretion in not removing certain jurors claimed 
objectionable for cause where counsel clearly and deliberately 
chose not to challenge them for cause); State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 
1021, 1022-23 (Utah 1987) (refusing to review a jury instruction 
for plain error where the defense counsel affirmatively led the 
trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong with the 
instruction). 
In this case a problem developed when the venire was exposed 
to a court calender indicating that defendant had been charged 
with another offense. However, it is obvious that defense 
counsel affirmatively joined in trial court's remedy of that 
problem, i.e., excusing the potentially tainted jurors based on 
the attending clerk's identification of those persons (R. 217-
20). Indeed, in response to the prosecutor's concern about a 
mistrial, defense counsel stated that he would not move for a 
mistrial since he had specifically stipulated to the trial 
court's method of curing the problem (R. 220). Defendant, 
represented on appeal by counsel different than at trial, has not 
argued plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel.4 
4
 Even considering the plain error doctrine, it has no 
application in this case. In explaining the relationship between 
plain error and invited error, the court in Bullock said: 
The plain error rule exists to permit 
review of trial court rulings as way of 
protecting a defendant from the harm that can 
be caused from less-than-perfect counsel. 
But the purpose of that rule is in no way 
implicated if defense counsel consciously 
10 
Therefore, this Court should decline to review his claim. 
PQINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE JURY VERDICT, FOR WHICH THERE 
WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
In order to successfully challenge the juryfs verdict the 
reviewing court must find that the evidence and its inferences 
are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree. 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded by rule on other 
grounds, State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). In 
undertaking such review, the appellate court will "view the 
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, in the 
light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 
732, 738 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). "The jury, not the 
appellate court, weighs the evidence and assesses witness 
credibility/ so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences 
elects to permit evidence +n ue admitted as 
part of a defense strategy .rafter th^n 
through inadvertence or n^iect. 
Bullock. 791 P.2d at 159 (emphasis added). In any event, it is 
inconceivable that any reference in the calender to a misdemeanor 
offense (R. 58, 218), even if seen by any venireman, "probably 
had an influence in producing the verdict rendered", see State v. 
Gee. 541 P.2d 6, 7 (Utah 1975) (new trial not merited where there 
was no showing that a juror was actually exposed to a photograph 
of the twenty-two month-old murder victim or that it affected the 
juror's deliberation), where defendant himself testified that he 
had been previously convicted of forgery, a second degree felony 
(R. 58, 404). Cf. State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah App. 
1992) (finding harmless any possible error in allowing the 
admission of potentially prejudicial testimony when defendant 
failed to object to other testimony having substantially the same 
import), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
11 
support the juryfs findings, we will not disturb them. See State 
v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)." Ibid. 
To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the evidence 
in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing 
it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so marshal 
the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of 
insufficiency considered on appeal. Mincy. 838 P.2d at 652 n.l 
(citing Moore. 802 P.2d at 738-39). 
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant 
fails to marshal any evidence in support of the jury's verdict, 
arguing instead his own view of the evidence.5 On this ground 
5
 Specifically, defendant argues (1) the evidence did not 
show the stolen car was "operable," (2) the car was from Arizona, 
but according to prosecution witnesses had Washington license 
plates, (3) there was no direct evidence that defendant knew or 
believed the car was stolen, (4) the State's witnesses were 
inconsistent about the time defendant pushed the car to Andrea 
Hardman's house, (5) the investigating officer failed to take 
fingerprints from the car, which would have conclusively 
corroborated defendant's lack of contact with the stolen car and 
(6) it is inherently improbable that defendant could have been in 
work clothes when pushing the car to the Hardman residence. 
Appellant's Br. at 15-17. 
None of these arguments take cognizance of the standard of 
review applied to the jury's verdict, to wit: that the jury may 
make its own credibility determinations and make reasonable 
inferences from the evidence and that its verdict is reversed 
only upon a showing of inherent improbability or substantial 
inconclusiveness. 
Moreover, the arguments lack substance: (1) Lee Berge, owner 
of LA Auto, testified that the missing car had passed an 
inspection, and both Andrea and her mother collectively testified 
that they saw defendant driving the 1985 red Mazda on September 
24 and 28 (R. 309, 348-49, 382-83); (2) the jury was entitled to 
infer that defendant had simply put Washington license plates on 
the stolen car; (3) the jury could readily have inferred 
defendant's knowledge that the car was stolen from his possession 
and deliberate instructions to both Andrea and her mother not to 
license the car and to hide among other abandoned cars when done 
using it for parts (R. 356-58, 385); (4) only Doug Hardman's 
12 
alone the Court should refuse to consider the merits of 
defendant's claim. 
In any event, the evidence was sufficient. Under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), the State was required to show that on 
October 7, 1994, defendant, with a purpose to deprive the owner, 
disposed of an operable motor vehicle belonging to LA Auto, 
knowing or believing that it had probably been stolen (Jury 
Instruction #4, R. 77, attached at Addendum B).6 Andrea Hardman 
and Diane Davis collectively testified that they saw defendant 
drive a red Mazda on September 24 and 28, 1994 (R. 348-49, 382-
83). The red 1985 Mazda that both witnesses testified defendant 
pushed to the Hardman residence on October 7 was the car stolen 
from LA Auto, evidenced by the matching VIN (R. 3 02, 330, 352-56, 
386). Defendant's intent to deprive LA Auto of its property was 
estimate of the time when he saw defendant push the car suggested 
an inconsistency, which the jury evidently discounted since 
Andrea and her mother testified fairly closely about the time (R. 
369, 388, 459); (5) the failure of the investigating officer to 
take fingerprints has no bearing on the sufficiency of the 
evidence that was adduced; and (6) contrary to defendant's 
suggestion, none of the State's witnesses testified about how 
defendant was dressed on October 7. Indeed, because there was no 
discrepancy in the testimony, it is unlikely that the jury 
attached any significance to Collett's testimony that defendant 
was neatly dressed when he left Vernal (R. 3 96). 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), provides: 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, 
retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, 
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in 
concealing, selling, or withholding the 
property from the owner, knowing the property 
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner 
of it. 
13 
shown not only by the fact of defendant's extended possession, 
but also by the diminishment of its value by defendant's 
dismantling the car. Finally, the jury was reasonably entitled 
to infer defendant's belief that the car was stolen from his very 
deliberate instructions to Andrea not license the car and then 
that she dispose of it where it would not likely be recovered as 
a stolen vehicle (R. 356-58, 385). 
QHAh ftRgVMSNT NOT EEOUPSTEP 
Based on this Courtfs prior development of the issues raised 
in this case, the State does not request oral argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this % day of April, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Mark 
T. Ethington, Day & Barney, attorney&^for defendant, 45 E. Vine 
Street, Murray, Utah 84107, this t day of April, 1996 
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ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER ^ 
In order to establish the commission of any crime charged, 
the State must prove certain essential facts which the statutes 
of this State define as being necessary elements constituting the 
crime charged. In the case now before the Court, proof of the 
commission of the crime of "Possession of Stolen Property" as 
charged in the Information requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of each of the following: 
1. That on or between the 7th day of October, 1994, and 
the 8th day of October, 1994; 
2. In Uintah County, State of Utah; 
3. Timothy Kent Redmond; 
4. Did receive, retain or dispose of the property of 
another, knowing that it had been stolen, or believing 
that it had probably been stolen; 
5. With a purpose to deprive the owner thereof; 
6. Said property was an operable motor vehicle. 
Therefore, if you find from the evidence received during the 
trial that the State has proven each and every one of these 
essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt it would be your duty 
to find the Defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you find by 
the evidence received during the trial that the State has failed 
to prove any one of those essential facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it would be your duty to find the Defendant not guilty. 
